attention here to both plusvalías (windfalls) and minusvalías (wipeouts)? First, the latter is very much the exceptional case. Given population growth, urbanisation and the fixed supply of land, public interventions -in the form of provision of infrastructure and urban services or of land use regulation -tend generally to trigger large increases in urban land values. Second, public authorities seem less eager to capture plusvalias than to compensate for the minusvalias that result from their actions. The general rule in Latin America has been 'reverse value capture': generous compensation when expropriating properties for public projects (Maricato, 2000) . 4 In the political arena, arguments in favour of value capture are made by representatives of the left (progressives) as well as from the right (conservatives or neo-liberals). For those on the left, value capture makes it possible to control market excesses, such as land speculation, besides providing a way to extend land value taxation. The most radical expression of this idea is found in Cuba, where the state still holds, directly, or indirectly through its enterprises and pub lic entities, a large stock of land, even within city limits and in privileged areas. Another example may be found among grassroots social movements in Brazil, which promote progressive property tax as an antidote to land speculation, notably by large landowners in urban peripheries, and as an alternative source of local revenues. Theorists from the right support value capture -above all in the form of charges applied at the margin -to promote market efficiency. It may inhibit free riders, and so achieve a closer fit between social costs/benefits to private owners. It can be a mechanism to enforce the principle of economic liberalism that each agent should be responsible for the cost it imposes on society -thereby limiting public expenditure on items that have not been assigned priority by the population.
5
More pragmatic support for value capture policies comes from the urban planning discipline. Some practitioners find it a useful means of promoting urban developments that are socially inclusive and consistent with urban master plans. Such views are well represented in Colombia. Even critics of comprehensive urban planning also see value capture policies as an integral part of strategies to make urban developments more viable, or as a guarantee of the political sustainability of largescale individual projects. This view has shaped urban development strategies in São Paulo in particular. Value capture policies also find supporters in the public finance arena. Some support comes from those who believe that property taxes are in general excessive. Value capture is then seen as a specific means of funding new developments without burdening most property owners.
5 Conversely, those who believe that urban property is insufficiently taxed see value capture as a useful step in the right direction, and a means to promoting a positive tax culture. There appears to 5 This principle still guides public policy in Chile. 5 There is a great deal of resistance to property taxes in both North and Latin America.
That is one reason why value capture instruments -impact and development fees -are widely used in North America in particular. Some local authorities are have placed caps on the collection of property taxes, and in some cases these have become deeply entrenched. In 1993 the Santo André (Brazil) city administration passed a law granting a 40 percent reduction on the property tax, to be valid only for one year.
However, this reduction has been maintained and become an effective tax cap because of pre-existing law stating that the value of the tax in the current year could not exceed its value in the previous year.
be a mutually reinforcing relationship between public expenditures that increase the value of land, and revenues that are raised as a result of this increased value.
There is thus support for the idea of value capture from many quarters. There are also many disagreements about the mode of implementation, and a great deal of outright opposition, some of it fierce and ideological, based on defe nce of private property rights.
Some conclusions from the Latin American experience

6
Notwithstanding the diversity of approaches to and experiences of land value capture in Latin America, it is possible to draw some broad conclusions. 2. However, its application in the urban policy agenda is still limited.
Despite accumulated experiences of practical applications of the principles of value capture, the policy is not widely employed or even debated within the sphere of urban policy. In some instances, promising value capture initiatives have gained prominence in their own times, only to be forgotten later. An important example is the wellknown Lander Report from Venezuela, which proposed in the 1960s that land and its increments in value should be the main source of financing for urban development 6 In this section we have used information from several studies conducted by the 3. Legislation often exists but is not implemented.
As in many countries in the region, the variety of value capture instruments available in Mexico, ranging from the contribución por mejoras (a special assessment or betterment levy aimed at recovering the costs of public works) to taxes on plusvalías, 
There is strong ideological resistance
This strong resistance to value capture may take the form of misleading interpretations, stereotyped objections or opposition on abstract principle. It is not hard to find arguments to justify the view that the application of value capture instruments is neither timely nor appropriate: for example, that taxes on land values are inflationary and disruptive of well-functioning markets, or that they involve unacceptable double taxation of the same asset.
7 Stereotyped objections include:
• The revenues from value capture are not significant or are not justified when compared with the administrative costs incurred.
• The public administration would not have the technical competence or human resources effectively to implement value capture.
• The application of value capture instruments would be antisocial and regressive, since poor populations, which have the greatest need for more urban infrastructure, have the least capacity to pay. Other favourable factors include support from international financial institutions for levying user charges on public facilities and the recovering of the costs of public investments from beneficiaries. The growing popularity of new value capture instruments can also be attributed to some frustration with the poor results obtained from the application of taxes and other traditional charges related to urban land in past decades, in terms of both revenues and urban policy objectives.
Pragmatism overrides ethical or theoretical justifications.
A corollary to the preceding point is that the growing popularity of value capture seems to be inspired more by pragmatism than by ethics, notions of equality, or theoretical and political justifications. Some reforms may even have been introduced without full political awareness of the process, or of its theoretical importance, as 9 It is worth noting that even in Cuba one finds a vigorous program through which the Office of the Historian in Havana, operating as a kind of property holding company, refinances its state-owned operations with land value increments resulting from urban renovation projects in the form of rents charged to private development partners. The São Paulo version, known as operacões interligadas (linkage operations) has been employed by city administration from opposing political and ideological tendencies. Equally, progressive local governments are sometimes reluctant to apply these instruments, and may even reject them notion altogether, for three reasons. First, they may believe that such contributions would be simply a mechanism to impose additional fiscal charges with no redistributive impact whatsoever. Second, even when the resulting revenues are earmarked for the low-income population, they may be insufficient to reduce the absolute differences between rich and poor in the access to serviced land (Furtado, 1999) . Third, they may heed the intergenerational argument that value capture charges are being imposed on newer, generally poor, residents who need services, whereas earlier generations were not charged for infrastructure services or amenities. The "Robin Hood" image of value capture policies fades once it becomes clear that often only a very small part of the increased value that the owner receives is actually captured for public purposes. This point seems to have been well understood by many lower-income populations, like those in Lima, where a successful programme featuring some 30 projects used the contribución de mejoras to finance public works in the early 1990s. The alleged inability of poor urban populations to pay for improved services appears often to be a myth. In practice, the strategy of attracting some public intervention to one's neighbourhood -even if it means paying some of the costs -may be better for poor people than the alternative: neglect. This point should, nevertheless, be taken with caution, in light of certain experiences where the value capture has been applied in low-income areas with purposes other than benefiting the occupants -for example, to justify the eviction or force the departure of those who cannot pay for the improvements.
Final Considerations
Despite the unimpressive history outlined above of attempts to introduce or implement value capture in Latin America, value capture policies are undeniably arousing new interest and becoming more acceptable. Initiatives to implement the principle have grown in both number and creativity, and its virtues -beyond being simply an alternative source of public revenue -are becoming better understood.
Public authorities are realising that their prerogatives to control land use rights and to determine the location and timing of pub lic works can be bargained for contributions to the public good from the beneficiaries of those decisions. They also see that transparent discussions over these issues reduces the scope for "under the table" deals.
As the link between public intervention and land value increase is becoming more visible, attitudes are changing to be more conducive to building a fiscal culture that will strengthen property taxes and local revenues in general. Much remains to be done in two spheres: researching the complex nature of value capture policies; and promoting greater understanding among public officials with regard to how it can be used to benefit their communities.
